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General Motors was once regarded as one of the best managed and most successful firms in the 
world, but between 1980 and 2009 its share of the US market fell from 62.6 to 19.8 percent, and 
in 2009 the firm went bankrupt. In this paper we argue that the conventional explanation for this 
decline – namely high legacy labor and health care costs – is seriously incomplete, and that 
GM’s share collapsed for many of the same reasons that many of the other highly successful 
American firms of the 50s, 60s and 70s were forced from the market, including a failure to 
understand the nature of the competition they faced and an inability to respond effectively once 
they did. We focus particularly on the problems GM encountered in developing the relational 
contracts essential to modern design and manufacturing. We discuss a number of possible causes 
for these difficulties: including GM’s historical practice of treating both its suppliers and its blue 
collar workforce as homogeneous, interchangeable entities, and its view that expertise could be 
partitioned so that there was minimal overlap of knowledge amongst functions or levels in the 
organizational hierarchy and decisions could be made using well-defined financial criteria.  We 
suggest that this dynamic may have important implications for our understanding of the role of 
management in the modern, knowledge based firm, and for the potential revival of 
manufacturing in the United States.  
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What led to General Motor’s decline? The answer is worth exploring, not only because General 
Motors was arguably the most important firm of its time but also because over the same period 
so many other once-great American firms also saw their positions erode dramatically. The US 2 
 
steel, electronics and apparel industries came very close to collapse. Only 13 percent of the 
Fortune 500 in 1963 were still amongst the 500 a half-century later. If we are to develop an 
understanding of how US manufacturing might be revived, it is important to understand what led 
to its decline.  
In this paper, we investigate this issue through an exploration of the decline of General Motors. 
We begin by laying out a number of alternative explanations. We suggest that while GM was 
indeed handicapped by high legacy costs, its decline was driven largely by poor design, inferior 
quality and low productivity. The principal puzzle of GM’s failure is thus the question of why 
the firm was seemingly unable to adopt the managerial practices that enabled its Japanese 
competitors – particularly Toyota – to introduce cars of much higher quality and much better 
design at significantly lower cost, even though GM was, at least initially, much richer than its 
rivals. The puzzle is deepened by the fact that the nature of the practices underlying Japanese 
success was extensively documented in both the scholarly and business press, and GM had 
firsthand experience with these practices through a joint venture with Toyota at a production 
facility in California starting in the middle of the 1980s
1.  
We identify two principal answers to this puzzle. The first argues that the historical success of 
General Motors led the firm’s senior managers to deny and/or misperceive the nature of the 
threat presented by Japanese competition for much of the 1970s and 1980s. The second focuses 
on the difficulties that GM experienced in the 1990s once the firm had made the decision to 
adopt Toyota’s managerial practices: we suggest that it took time for GM to understand exactly 
what Toyota was doing, and then problems in building new relational contracts greatly slowed 
GM’s efforts to respond effectively, either through innovation or by imitating Toyota’s efforts.
2. 
We close with a discussion of the implications of this history for efforts to revive American 
manufacturing.  
 
Parsing Alternative Explanations for the Decline of General Motors 
Perhaps the most popular explanation for the failure of General Motors is that decades of overly 
generous union contracts   put it at an overwhelming cost disadvantage (Ingrassia 2011). GM did 
                                                           
1GM also faced a challenge from European automakers during this period. However, their market share was well 
under 25% of that held by the Japanese, so for reasons of space we do not address it here. 
 
2 It seems unlikely that Toyota’s approach to the market was the “one best way” to compete; it is entirely possible 
that GM could have responded to Toyota’s challenge by developing its own innovative methods of designing and 
producing cars.  In what follows, we focus on GM’s difficulties in imitating Toyota because a) GM managers 
starting in the late 1990s often used Toyota as a benchmark and b) Toyota’s practices provide a clear alternative; had 
GM been able to adopt them easily, its performance would have improved significantly compared to the decades of 
stagnation we in fact saw.  For more discussion of the issue of alternatives to “Toyotism”, see Michel Freyssen et al, 
1998). 3 
 
have higher labor costs than Toyota. For example, the Associated Press (2007) reported that 
because of “legacy” health care and pensions owed to retired workers, labor costs at General 
Motors were as high as $73/hour, while GM’s Japanese competitors’ costs were roughly 
$48/hour.  Another calculation suggests that legacy costs at General Motors were about $1,600 
per car in 2005 (Welch and Beucke 2005). However there are several reasons for believing that 
this cost disadvantage was not the only issue that caused GM’s difficulties.  
First, GM’s legacy costs were high largely because of GM’s declining market share. If GM had 
maintained its 1980 US market share until 2009, for example, its per-car labor costs would have 
fallen by one-third.   
Second, poor quality and poor design was at least as significant a problem as that of legacy costs. 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s consumers complained that American cars suffered from noise, 
vibration and harshness and from poor ride quality (Train and Winston 2007). When Toyota and 
General Motors were running a joint venture together in the late 1980s and early 1990s, those 
cars coming off the line with the Toyota name plate commanded a more than 20 percent 
premium in the marketplace over their nearly-identical GM brethren (Sullivan 1998). More 
generally, in 2000 all GM cars sold on average for $3000 less than Toyotas or Hondas of 
comparable size and equipment (Train and Winston 2007) implying that GM’s pricing 
disadvantage was greater than its legacy cost disadvantage. It was not until 2012 that Chevrolet’s 
quality rankings began to approach those of Toyota and Honda.  
Third, General Motors appears to have been significantly less productive than its rivals in nearly 
every aspect of its operations.  For example Clark and Fujimoto (1991) found that in the late 
1980s the Japanese took 1.7 million adjusted engineering hours to develop a $14,000 car, while 
their US competitors took an average of 3.2 million hours. GM’s assembly operations were also 
persistently less productive than its rivals’. For example, Figure 2 shows a comparison developed 
by the MIT International Motor Vehicle Program between the GM plant in Framingham 
Massachusetts and the Toyota Takaoka plant in Japan. The first row shows gross hours required 
to assemble a car, while the second row shows that even after adjustments to ensure “apples to 
apples” comparisons, it was taking GM nearly double the number of hours to assemble a car 
(Womack, Jones and Roos 1990).  
Last but not least, direct labor costs (including legacy costs) were only 10 percent of GM’s total 
costs, while purchased parts were 70 percent (Helper and MacDuffie, 2008), and there is a great 
deal of evidence that GM’s management of its supplier network was significantly less effective 
than its Japanese rivals’. For example Clark and Fujimoto (1991) estimated that supplier 
contributions accounted for one-third of the difference in the Japanese automakers' advantage 
over their US counterparts in total engineering hours required to develop a new car, while the 
defect rates of parts supplied by Japanese companies were on the order of one-tenth the rate of 
those supplied by U.S. firms (Cusumano and Takeishi, 1991). Similarly in a sample of US 
automotive suppliers selling to both Toyota and U.S. automakers, Dyer and Hatch (2006) found 4 
 
that from 1990 to 1996 the average supplier reduced defects by 50 percent for Toyota, but only 
26 percent for their largest US customer.   
These failures are all the more striking in that they were widely documented as they were 
occurring. Industry observers deplored General Motors’ failure to introduce attractive small cars 
throughout the seventies and eighties and from 1984 on General Motors had privileged access to 
Toyota’s techniques through NUMMI (New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc.), a joint venture 
that GM formed with Toyota precisely to gain insight into Toyota’s capabilities. NUMMI was 
located in GM’s Fremont (California) plant, which had been closed two years before. The plant 
had been one of the least productive in GM, and had been famous for its troubled labor relations. 
Unexcused absenteeism often exceeded 20 percent, the plant had accumulated a backlog of over 
1,000 grievances, and the union-management relationship was described by a top union member 
as an “ongoing war” (Brown and Reich 1989). Despite this background, Toyota agreed to rehire 
the entire union hierarchy, and when production began, 99 percent of the assembly workers and 
75 percent of the skilled trades workers were former GM-Fremont employees and UAW 
members (Adler et al. 1997; Brown and Reich 1989). NUMMI went on to reach levels of 
productivity and quality comparable to those of Toyota’s Japanese plants (Womack, Jones and 
Roos 1990). Similarly, in 1983 GM invested more than $5 billion in Saturn, a home-grown 
attempt to reinvent GM’s product design procedures, manufacturing techniques and labor 
relations. The attempt was successful from many perspectives, and yet it, too, seems to have had 
only a minimal impact on the functioning of GM as a whole (Rubenstein and Kochan 2001).  
Moreover, during the key period of the 1980s, General Motors was not short of cash. Between 
1980 and 1985 the firm spent over $45 billion on acquisitions and automation (Keller 1989), a 
sum that at the time was more than the combined market value of Toyota and Honda. Nor does it 
seem plausible that the firm’s disadvantage was a function of unique features of Japanese culture 
or governance, or the uniquely recalcitrant nature of GM’s union and workforce, since the 
successes at both NUMMI and Saturn makes these explanations implausible.  
Another popular explanation for the troubles at the firm has been that the firm was simply badly 
managed (Keller 1989; Taylor 2010), but contemporaneous assessments suggest that GM’s 
senior managers were at least as capable as those at other firms. When Roger Smith was chief 
executive officer of GM in the 1980s, he was named Automotive Industries Man of the Year, 
Advertising Age’s Ad Man of the Year, and Financial World magazine’s Chief Executive Officer 
of the year, and he was also designated by the Gallagher Report as one of the 10 best executives 
in the United States (Finkelstein 2003). Yet at the same time Smith failed to invest in the 
development of small cars, spent hundreds of millions of dollars on “high technology” 
acquisitions that did little or nothing for GM, and (apparently) did little to diffuse the lessons of 
NUMMI across the company. 
What can explain these patterns? Why were the product development processes at General 
Motors so slow and expensive and its design capabilities so inferior? Why were  GM’s supplier 5 
 
network and assembly operations so much less productive than those of its rivals, and why was 
the quality of their output so much lower? Why did these trends persist for so long?  
One stream of work argues that these problems are failures of perception and motivation. 
Problems of perception – or of the failure to recognize that the world is changing – flow from the 
fact that senior managers tend to become overly reliant on the mental models and beliefs that 
undergirded the firm’s success in the first place. Problems of motivation – or of an unwillingness 
to act even once the need to change has been recognized – can arise when the selection 
environment in an industry is weak and/or senior managers are insufficiently motivated to act in 
the interests of the firm. (For an overview of this work, see Gibbons and Henderson 2013 and the 
references there.) 
In the case of General Motors, it is hard to tease these two issues apart without more detailed 
data, but since the American automobile industry in the 1950s and 1960s was a reasonably 
collusive oligopoly, it seems plausible that when Toyota and the other Japanese firms first began 
to make serious inroads into the US market, GM’s senior management of the firm had little 
experience of intense competition. Perhaps as a result, throughout the 1970s they blamed the 
success of their Japanese rivals on Japan’s low labor costs and inferior working conditions, and 
insisted that their own small cars were well designed and competitively viable, despite 
widespread ridicule in the industry press (Behr 1981). Qualitative accounts stress the ways in 
which the firm’s past success (and the industry’s insularity, due to its concentration in Detroit) 
led managers to dismiss Japanese inroads as reflecting the odd – even aberrant -- preferences of 
consumers on the East and West coasts, and to claim that data demonstrating Toyota’s superior 
productivity and quality was incorrect or misleading (Keller 1989; Taylor 2010; Yates 1983). A 
historically weak selection environment may thus have handicapped the firm when it had to 
respond to much stronger competition. 
Even after managers at General Motors became convinced that Toyota was indeed doing 
“something different” in its factories – a development many industry observers credit to the 
appointment of Roger Smith as chief executive officer in 1981– they appeared to have believed 
that the essence of Toyota’s advantage lay in tools like the fixtures designed to change stamping 
dies rapidly, or in the use of “just in time” inventory systems, rather than in the management 
practices that made it possible to develop and deploy these techniques. For example, Jeffrey 
Liker, a professor and consultant to GM since the 1980s, reported (in “This American Life,” 
2010). :  
One of the GM managers was ordered, from a very senior level—(it) came from a vice 
president – to make a GM plant look like NUMMI. And he said, "I want you to go there 
with cameras and take a picture of every square inch. And whatever you take a picture of; 
I want it to look like that in our plant. There should be no excuse for why we're different 
than NUMMI, why our quality is lower, why our productivity isn't as high, because 
you're going to copy everything you see. … Immediately, this guy knew that was crazy. 6 
 
We can't copy employee motivation; we can't copy good relationships between the union 
and management. That's not something you can copy, and you can't even take a 
photograph of it.  
Outside General Motors, the idea that one could copy NUMMI – or indeed any of Toyota’s 
advantages -- by simply copying the physical plant was seen to be mistaken quite early. “The 
Machine that Changed the World” (Womack, Jones and Roos 1990) – a report from the MIT 
automobile project that incorporated detailed productivity data from across the world and in 
which GM had actively participated, providing detailed data on its plants and attending meetings 
from 1985 on – was published in 1990, while Clark and Fujimoto’s (1991) detailed study of 
product development across the world automobile industry came out the following year. These 
studies (along with many others) documented the very different ways in which Toyota managed 
product design, assembly and its supplier network.  
Despite this flood of research, it took General Motors more than two decades to imitate Toyota’s 
practices consistently. While problems in perception and motivation are certainly plausible 
explanations of why GM took so long to fully internalize the idea that Toyota was indeed doing 
something differently, they are much less satisfactory explanations for why it took so long for the 
firm to respond effectively. Here we make the case that GM struggled for so long because 
Toyota’s practices were rooted in the widespread deployment of effective relational contracts – 
agreements based on subjective measures of performance that could neither be fully specified 
beforehand nor verified after the fact and that were thus enforced by the shadow of the future – 
and that GM’s history, organizational structure and managerial practices made it very difficult to 
maintain these kinds of agreements either within the firm or between the firm and its suppliers.  
We begin by describing the very different management practices General Motors and Toyota 
employed to design and manufacture automobiles in the 1970s and early1980s, paying particular 
attention to the ways in which GM’s were predicated on a view of workers, suppliers and even 
white collar employees as commodities whose work could be fully controlled by experts through 
the use of careful specifications and the spot market, while Toyota’s practices were critically 
dependent on joint problem solving across boundaries of all kinds, and thus on the existence of 
strong relational contracts.  
 
Comparing Managerial Practices at Toyota and General Motors 
Automotive Assembly  
In the 1960s and 1970s, jobs on the General Motors assembly line were very narrowly defined; a 
worker would perform the same set of tasks --for example, screwing in several bolts -- every 60 
seconds for eight to ten hours per day. Workers were not expected or encouraged to do anything 
beyond this single task. Responsibility for the design and improvement of the assembly system 7 
 
was vested firmly in the hands of supervisors and manufacturing engineers, while vehicle quality 
was the responsibility of the quality department, which inspected vehicles as they came off the 
assembly line. GM’s managers were notorious for believing that blue collar workers had little – 
if anything – to contribute to the improvement of the production process (Womack Jones and 
Roos 1990; Adler and Borys 1996). Relationships between blue collar workers and local 
management were actively hostile. For example Joel Smith, a NUMMI worker interviewed by 
Adler (1993) described life “in the old days”:  
In the old days, we fought for job security in various ways:  “Slow down, don't work so 
fast.”  “Don't show that guy next door how to do your job – management will get one of 
you to do both of your jobs.” “Every now and then, throw a monkey wrench into the 
whole thing so the equipment breaks down – the repair people will have to come in and 
we’ll be able to sit around and drink coffee. They may even have to hire another guy and 
that’ll put me further up on the seniority list. 
Management would respond in kind:  “Kick ass and take names. The dumb bastards don't know 
what they're doing.”…Management was looking for employees who they could bully into doing 
the job the way they wanted it done. The message was simply: “If you don't do it my way I’ll fire 
you and put somebody in who will. There are ten more guys at the door looking for your job.” 
Jobs on Toyota’s production line were even more precisely specified: for example, standardized 
work instructions specified which hand should be used to pick up each bolt. However, Toyota’s 
employees had a much broader range of responsibilities.
3 Each worker was extensively cross-
trained, and was expected to be able to handle 6-8 different jobs on the line. They were also 
responsible for both the quality of the vehicle and for the continual improvement of the 
production process itself. Each worker was expected to identify quality problems as they 
occurred, to pull the “andon” cord that was located at each assembly station to summon help to 
solve them in real time, and if necessary to pull the andon cord again to stop the entire 
production line. Workers were also expected to play an active role in teams that had 
responsibility for “continuous improvement” or for identifying improvements to the process that 
might increase the speed or efficiency of the line. As part of this process, workers were trained in 
statistical process control and in experimental design. 
General Motors faced two problems in imitating these practices. The first was in understanding 
exactly how they were constructed. Milgrom and Roberts (1990, 1995) argue, for example, that 
                                                           
3 The workforce management techniques employed by Toyota have been extensively studied by labor economists 
and specialists in industrial relations. Together they are often called “high performance work systems.” There is no 
single definition of “high-performance work system,” but three overarching elements have been identified in the 
literature. In general, firms with high-performance work systems (1) implement effective incentive systems, (2) pay 
a great deal of attention to skills development ,and (3) use teams and create widespread opportunities for distributed 
communication and problem solving. For examples, see , Kochan et al. (1986), MacDuffie (1995), Huselid (1995), 
Ichniowski et al. (1997), Pfeffer (1998), Appelbaum et. al. (2000) and Black and Lynch (2001). 8 
 
diffusion of these techniques was hampered by the fact that they display strong 
complementarities, and Bloom and his collaborators (2013a, b) make the case for thinking about 
these practices as “management technologies” that face similar  barriers to diffusion as do more 
conventional technologies.  
The second was that these practices were necessarily rooted in relational contracts. It was, for 
example, very difficult to specify under exactly what circumstances a worker should pull the 
andon cord, or what behaviors constituted being an effective team member. Shutting down the 
line for a popular model could cost $10,000 in lost profits per minute (Helper 2011), so 
management setting up this system needed to be confident that a worker deciding to pull the 
andon cord would have both the knowledge and the incentive to exercise sophisticated judgment. 
Conversely, workers would only pull the cord if were confident that an appropriate relational 
contract was in place (Gibbons and Henderson 2013). Similarly MacDuffie’s (1997) detailed 
description of the practices underlying shop-floor problem solving in the industry suggests that 
successful process quality improvement depended on processes that allowed for the inclusion of 
multiple perspectives on any single problem, the use of problem categories that were “fuzzy,” 
and the development of a common language for discussing problems. It seems implausible that 
employees could be motivated to participate in these kinds of activities through the use of formal 
contracts that specified in advance every kind of quality problem and its appropriate response.  
Supply Chain Management  
US automakers' relationships with outside suppliers from the 1950s to the early1990s were also 
very different from those of their Japanese competitors. They were characterized by short-term -- 
usually one-year -- contracts, arms'-length relationships, and a reliance on as many as six to eight 
suppliers per part. Purchase decisions were driven overwhelmingly by price and were governed 
by written contracts that involved precise specification of the purchased part. There was little 
communication between suppliers and either the central engineering groups who designed the 
parts or the assembly plants responsible for using them, a reflection of General Motor’s deeply 
held belief that experts should do the planning and designing while implementation should be 
accomplished through a detailed division of labor (MacDuffie and Helper 1997).  While this 
belief did not promote quality, it did facilitate the maintenance of “spot” relationships with 
suppliers. 
In the Japanese automobile industry, in contrast, firms were much more likely to enter into long-
term relationships with suppliers and were much less likely to switch suppliers because of small 
differences in quoted price. Because of their belief in genchi gembutsu (that detailed knowledge 
of context is valuable), Toyota and its competitors typically did not develop a detailed design for 
many parts in a new model. Instead, they would specify the part’s exterior dimensions and its 
performance characteristics, and allow a specialist supplier to design the part instead to best 
match its production process (Cusumano 1985; Smitka 1991; Nishiguchi 1994).  Toyota’s use of 
“knowledge overlap” (Takeishi 2002) between its engineers and its suppliers’ engineers not only 9 
 
allowed for better problem-solving, but also helped Toyota ensure that its suppliers remained 
near the production frontier. In contrast, a top purchasing manager at General Motors explained 
in 1993 that “GM doesn’t need to understand the technologies that our suppliers use—we let the 
market tell us” (Helper, unpublished interview).  
Suppliers to the Japanese car firms were significantly more likely to invest in organizational 
capabilities such as quality training and maintaining a product-design staff, allowing them to 
engage in activities such as “value analysis” and “value engineering,” which are techniques that 
involve examining the contribution to cost and functionality of each aspect of a component's 
design. The Japanese automobile firms and their suppliers also invested in organizational 
mechanisms designed to increase information flow, which meant that the parties came to deeply 
understand each other's products and processes.  These practices promoted continuous 
improvement, allowing Japanese suppliers to reduce prices every year for decades while 
remaining profitable, and enabled the Japanese automotive companies to be confident in 
producing “just-in-time” rather than holding costly inventory (Lieberman and Diemeester 1999; 
Lieberman and Asaba 1997; Lieberman, Helper, and Diemeester 1999). 
US and Japanese automobile firms also developed very different ways of handling the design 
changes that were frequently made as responses to unforeseen interaction problems.   Soderberg 
(1989), for example, estimates that on average, each part was changed at least once during this 
period.  Thus suppliers were often not making precisely the part they were contracted to make.  
In US practice, changing specifications meant legally changing the contract; and suppliers were 
often able to extract high prices for making these changes. In contrast, Japanese manufacturers 
simply asked suppliers to make the change; both parties trusted each other to “sort things out” 
later. As one supplier to several automakers said, “Honda cares about making the part fit the car, 
while Ford cares about making the part fit the blueprint”  (MacDuffie and Helper 1997). 
In consequence, the relationships between Japanese firms and their suppliers were deeply rooted 
in relational contracts. Suppliers "know that as long as they make a good-faith effort to perform 
as they should, the assembler will ensure that they receive a reasonable return on their 
investment" (Womack, Jones and Roos 1990) and as long as the supplier continued to meet the 
automaker's expectations, the supplier could count on the relationship continuing indefinitely. 
Smitka (1991) describes these arrangements as "governance by trust." This reliance did not mean 
that the Japanese paid less attention to performance management than the American firms.  
Toyota’s relational contract with suppliers was not “a cozy relationship,” as one manager of a 
supplier company pointed out (Helper and Sako, 1995). The firm pushed its suppliers very hard 
to reduce costs and avoid defects; it reduced the market share of suppliers who did not meet 
these strict goals, and exited the relationship completely if improvement was not forthcoming. In 
fact, Honda and Toyota collected more data about supplier performance than GM did during this 
period.  However, in contrast to a “make the numbers” culture (Henderson and Repenning 2010), 
Toyota did not award high-powered incentives to firms or individuals that performed well on one 
or more of these targets. Instead, the objective data was used as an aid to understanding the “root 10 
 
causes” of problems, in conjunction with subjective data and intuition (Helper and MacDuffie 
1997).  
 
Product Design and Development 
Before 1984, product development within General Motors was managed by three separate 
organizations: a car division, such as Buick, that was responsible for the car’s design; Fisher 
Body, which was responsible for the detailed engineering, and GMAD (the General Motors 
Assembly Division), which would modify plants and equipment to prepare for the new model 
and would ultimately assemble the car. There was only very limited interaction between the 
three. All divisions reported ultimately to the president, who was responsible for arbitrating 
disputes. According to Keller (1989, pp. 100, 101, 106), “Each of the three (organizations) 
viewed itself as a separate entity with the necessity of protecting its own autonomy.” Consultants 
hired to evaluate the process found that “the bureaucracy was a virtual quicksand bog of 
procedures” in which “individuals were not held accountable for the decisions they made.” 
Then in 1984, General Motors was reorganized into two divisions: “BOC”, which was composed 
of the Buick, Oldsmobile and Cadillac car divisions, and “CPC”, which was composed of 
Chevrolet, Pontiac and GM Canada. Fisher Body and GMAD were broken up and combined 
with BOC and CPC. The apparent intention was to streamline and integrate new product 
development, but the reorganization created considerable confusion and did not noticeably 
improve performance. The informal agreements – or in our terms, the relational contracts -- that 
lower-level GM managers had established with each other were purposely broken up, either 
because they were not valued or because they were assumed to be an active impediment to 
improvement. However GM’s formal organization was so cumbersome that work proceeded 
even more slowly when managers did not know if they could trust their counterparts to ignore 
some of the red tape (Keller 1989), an observation consistent with Henderson and Kaplan’s 
(2005) suggestion that the need to remake relational contracts may be a significant barrier to the 
ability to develop new ones. Both divisions relied on “light-weight project teams” – coordinating 
mechanisms in which the project manager attempted to coordinate the work of the multiple 
functions whose work was critical to product design, but without the benefit of any real authority 
over the team’s members (Clark and Fujimoto 1991). Within this structure, key decisions about 
product design appear to have been driven as much by the finance function as by the project 
leader, and engineers and process designers appear to have focused as much on the health of 
their own local organizations as on the strength of the design process itself. 
For example, in the mid-1990s, General Motors previewed a widely-heralded concept vehicle 
called the Aztek.  As the Washington Post pointed out: “The concept car actually did something 
few GM designs do: arrive before a trend -- this time, the crossover SUV that combines the 
attributes of a truck and a passenger car” (Weissman 2005). However, the production car 11 
 
“represented all that is wrong with GM's design process”, according to a GM executive. “The 
penny-pinchers demanded that costs be kept low by putting the concept car on an existing 
minivan platform. That destroyed the original proportions and produced the vehicle's bizarre, 
pushed-up back end.” According to Motoramic magazine, “Tight budgets and boardroom 
dominance of manufacturing over design meant the underlying bits of the Aztek were set in 
stone before stylists ever lifted a pencil; a wheezy 3.4-liter V-6, a frame that was about 15 
percent too big, and no freedom for designers to alter any major components killed whatever 
visual appeal and sporty pretentions the original shape held” (Hyde 2013).  The car won several 
awards for ugliness, never reached its modest sales targets, and was soon taken out of 
production.   
In contrast, product design and development at Toyota was managed through tightly knit, 
dedicated “heavyweight” project development teams. Team leaders were managers oflong 
experience who had full authority over a team composed not only of representatives from 
engineering and design, but also from manufacturing, sales and marketing. They had 
responsibility for the entire life cycle of the product: from concept through detailed engineering 
to manufacturing and commercial launch. For example, one team defined its goal as designing a 
car that felt like “a rugby player in a business suit,” a concept that informed every aspect of the 
subsequent process (Clark and Fujimoto 1991).  
While performance at General Motors, when it was judged at all, seems to have been judged on 
the basis of well-defined rules or easily observable metrics such as whether individuals met pre-
specified deadlines, performance at Toyota was judged on the basis of the performance  of the 
team as a whole.
4 More broadly, the Toyota Production System was embedded in the Toyota 
Management System, via a set of goals that linked shop floor activities and targets to the 
objectives of both the senior team and functional managers.  These goals were jointly determined 
through lively communication across multiple levels of the organization, again suggesting that 
the white collar workforce was shot through with relational contracts (Liker, 2004; Sako 2008) 
 
Why Did General Motors Struggle to Adopt Toyota’s Management Practices? 
General Motors’ share of the US market began to plummet around 1980, but it took the firm 
more than 20 years to adopt Toyota’s techniques. For example, MacDuffie (1995) and 
MacDuffie et al. (1996) surveyed auto plants around the world and they found only slow 
progress toward using a Toyota-style production system from 1986 to 1993.  Similarly, Helper 
conducted surveys of US auto suppliers in 1989 and 1993. In 1984, suppliers reported that they 
                                                           
4 One extreme example of this is reported in Wright (1979). He reports that at General Motors in the seventies it was 
considered a great honor for a junior executive to be chosen to run the slide presentation at board meetings, but that 
the executive's career could be ended if he put a slide in the projector incorrectly.  12 
 
did not expect their relationship to last into the future, and they did not expect to provide or 
receive “help not required by the contract.” By 1989, GM had the highest scores among the 
Detroit three on items such as expecting that their customer would help them rather than switch 
immediately to a rival offering a better deal, but by 1993, suppliers (again) felt that GM could 
not be trusted (Helper 1994; Helper and Sako 1995). Why was this?  
First, it took General Motors some time to understand exactly what Toyota was doing, and to 
attempt to implement the full bundle of practices necessary to successfully imitate its Japanese 
rivals. For example, managers at GM’s Van Nuys plant introduced elements of the practices that 
had been implemented at NUMMI but they resulted in significantly less improvement, and Van 
Nuys was soon closed (“This American Life,” 2010).  
Second, General Motors had great difficulty building the relational contracts on which these 
contracts relied. The research literature has typically assumed that if a relational contract is 
mutually beneficial, it will naturally emerge (Levin 2003), but a body of work has begun to 
explore the conditions under which relational contracts may be hard to build. Here we draw on 
Gibbons and Henderson’s (2013) summary of this research to explore the degree to which it 
yields insight into GM’s decline. 
Gibbons and Henderson (2013) outline three broad classes of explanation for why relational 
contracts may be difficult to build. First, there may be unobserved heterogeneity in the costs of 
using relational contracts. For example, if the contracting parties have heterogeneous discount 
rates, then an equilibrium may emerge in which more patient players form relational contracts 
while less patient players do not For example, in a model of supply relationships, Board (2011) 
finds that the optimal relational contract has an insider-outside form where some suppliers are 
“insiders” who are used routinely and the rest are “outsiders”, who are never used, even in 
periods where they are more efficient; if the parties become more patient, the set of insiders 
grows and efficiency improves. Similarly, if the principal has private information about an 
outside option, then incentives for a relational contract will only strengthen gradually, as the 
agent becomes convinced that the principal is unlikely to renege (Halac 2012). Second, problems 
of credibility may arise when it is hard to tell whether a party is taking a hard line in a relational 
situation because it wishes to take advantage of the other party, or because a poor state of the 
world is genuinely forcing them to take a hard line Chassang (2010) and Li and Matouschek 
(2011). Third, problems of clarity, or the simple inability of principle and agent to communicate 
with each other, may also create problems 
Exploring the history of General Motors suggests all three of these theories may have played a 
role in shaping the firm’s history. Up until the 1990s, GM was a firm receiving oligopoly rents. 
In this situation, arm's-length relations maximized profits compared to relational contracts, 
because they made suppliers easily replaceable, thus reducing suppliers’ ability to bargain for a 
share of these rents (Helper and Levine 1992). Historically it may thus have been the case that 
GM’s returns to adopting relational contracts were lower than those of its rivals. As these rents 13 
 
shrunk, however, GM’s long-term payoffs from adversarial behavior fell and it seems plausible 
that the returns to adopting relational contracts became quite high.  
At this stage, General Motors faced problems of credibility and clarity. The credibility issue 
arose because it appears to have been hard for GM to alter past patterns of behavior and hard for 
GM’s workers and suppliers to believe that these patterns were indeed changing. Researchers 
have long suggested that it takes time to build trust, and that when one or both of the parties to a 
relationship have a history of “bad behavior,” building trust-based relationships may be even 
harder (Bachmann and Zaheer. 2006). Remember, GM’s stance towards both its blue collar 
employees and its suppliers had been deeply adversarial. In 1984, for example, the company 
announced that it was interested in modifying the union contract to support the use of “teams” 
and of “joint problem solving”—but then a leaked internal memo suggested that GM was 
planning to use the new contract  to reduce headcount (Russo 1984). Throughout the 1980s, 
many in union leadership remained convinced that GM was implementing lean production only 
as part of an attempt to speed up production and to put employees under even greater pressure 
(Parker and Slaughter 1994). GM thus faced significant problems in building credibility. 
General Motors’ practice of focusing almost entirely on short-term financial results, along with 
its multiple levels of control and its large number of employees and suppliers, also made building 
credibility difficult. Senior management could announce a commitment to long term 
relationships and to building trust, but until these announcements were coupled with similar 
commitments and altered incentives at the local level, neither blue collar employees nor suppliers 
appears to have believed that the local managers with whom they had to deal would adhere to a 
relational contract. At the local level, this may have been partly a function of the lack of 
accountability or follow through that seems to have characterized GM. For example (according 
to This American Life, 2010) “Weller [a GM manager sent to spread the NUMMI gospel] said 
some managers were responsive. Others weren't — like the one who asked him to leave his 
factory after Weller made his presentation about the NUMMI system.  When asked why the CEO 
wouldn't fire a plant manager who resisted a system that was producing better cars at lower costs, 
Weller said: "It's a big company... and it doesn't work that way." 
Similarly in 1982, Darrah C. Porter, the executive director for purchasing activities at General 
Motors, told a reporter for Iron Age: “We need to throw off the old shackles of adversarial 
confrontation and work together in an enlightened era of mutual trust and confidence.” However, 
one purchasing agent was quoted in the same article as saying “I find it hard to stop thinking that 
efficient purchasing means having a lot of vendors fighting over a job.”  In another example of 
changes in desired behavior not being accompanied by changed incentives, the Wall Street 
Journal in 1984 reported that GM wanted suppliers to locate within GM’s Buick City complex, 
to promote better communication. However, GM provided no assurance of future business to 
suppliers who incurred the significant costs of moving, making suppliers reluctant to re-locate 
(Helper 1987).  14 
 
More broadly, General Motors’ history of market dominance appears to have made the firm very 
risk averse, perhaps because the firm’s extraordinary success made risk avoidance a profit-
maximizing strategy for many years. One long-ago incident that might have helped to set the 
stage for such a policy was the failure of GM's attempt to introduce the copper-cooled engine in 
1922. The attempt failed largely because the product was forced on the Chevrolet division in 
violation of GM's policy of divisional autonomy. However, Alfred Sloan (1963, p. 69) drew a 
broader lesson: he claimed that "it was not necessary to lead in design or run the risk of untried 
experiment.” This incident apparently had a searing staying power; it was cited as late as 1987 
by GM engineers as a reason to avoid technological risks (Helper 1991). 
We suspect that problems of clarity, or in communicating the terms of the various relational 
contracts that General Motors was seeking to put in place, were also central to the firm’s 
difficulties. Table 1, for example, summarizes both the decision problem and the choices for 
managers and workers that made up the relational contract underlying the use of the andon cord. 
Similarly Table 2 summarizes the knowledge that had to be mutually understood for relational 
contracts with suppliers to be viable, while Table 3 outlines the kinds of knowledge required to 
build successful heavyweight product development teams. These tables suggest the immense 
amount of ambiguous information that had to be successfully communicated before a Toyota-
style relational contract could be put in place. Not only did everyone concerned have to learn 
about the actions that constituted “cooperation” – and to come to believe that these actions were 
in their own best interests – but they also had to learn about each other’s defection temptations in 
a world in which they might not even know their own.  
 
Table 1: Cooperation, Defection, and Punishment in the Use of the Andon Cord.  
  Action 
Agent  Cooperate  Defect  Punish 
Worker  1. Pull the andon cord when 
worker sees a problem 
2. Offer suggestions on 
improvements to the 
production process (that 
might make workers’ job 
redundant) 
1a. Never pull the andon 
cord (out of fear of being 
punished) 
1b. Pull the andon cord to 
stop the line and avoid work 
when there is no true 
problem 
2. Keep improvements 
hidden from co-workers and 
managers 
 
1. Sabotage the 
manufacturing line 
2. Pull andon cord 
frequently 
3. Engage in absenteeism 15 
 
Supervisor  1. Recognize potential 
problem when andon cord 
pulled and aid in problem-
solving 
2. Implement improvements 
without necessarily cutting 
jobs 
3. Accept authority of work 
teams to make some shop-
floor decisions 
1. Punish workers for 
pulling andon cord (even 
appropriately)  
2. Cut workforce once they 
discover potential 
innovations 
3. Interfere in work teams 
and override their decisions 
1. Penalize workers 
(financially or socially) for 
pulling andon cord 
2. Remove the andon cord 
Source: Gibbons and Henderson (2013) 
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Table 2: Cooperation, defection, and punishment in supplier relationships at Toyota.  
 
  Action 
Agent  Cooperate  Defect  Punish 
Supplier  1. Invest in engineering and 
process development skills 
that will enable the firm to 
translate approximate 
specifications into a final 
part 
2. When problems emerge, 
work rapidly and effectively 
to fix them 
1. Fail to invest sufficient 
time or attention in 
responding to Toyota’s 
requests. 
2. Attempt to extract 
monopoly rents once the 
relationship is established.  
 
1. Deliver parts late, or not 
to spec.  
2. Fail to cooperate in the 
redesign of critical parts. 
 
Toyota  1. Allow the supplier to 
make a “reasonable return” 
on their investments 
2. When things go wrong, 
provide resources to the 
supplier to help to fix them 
 
1. Fail to invest sufficient 
time or attention in 
responding to supplier’s 
requests. 
2. Attempt to extract 
monopoly rents once the 
relationship is established.  
 
 
1. Cease working with the 
supplier. 
 
Source: Gibbons and Henderson (2013), reproduced with permission. 
 
Table 3: Cooperation, defection, and punishment within heavy weight product development 
teams at Toyota.  
 
  Action 
Agent  Cooperate  Defect  Punish 
Team Leader  1. Support team members in 
working together – ensure 
maximum possible support 
for the project.  
2. When problems emerge, 
work rapidly and effectively 
to fix them 
3. Recognize each team 
member’s contribution 
appropriately. 
 
1. Fail to collect resources 
for the team, or to protect 
the team when threatened 
by the rest of the 
organization. 
2. Play favorites with team 
members, and fail to reward 
them for their contributions.  
 
 
1. Give negative reviews of 
team members to the rest of 
the organization, or refuse 
to work with them.  17 
 
Team 
member 
1. Bring all possible skills 
and capabilities to the team. 
2. Invest in understanding 
the point of view and 
expertize of other team 
members. Be open to 
continuously learning. 
3. “Go the extra mile” to 
ensure the success of the 
team, even when it fails to 
benefit oneself or one’s 
home function.  
1. Fail to invest sufficient 
time or attention in the 
team’s work.  
2. Drag one’s heals in 
working with other 
members of the team. Put 
the interests of the home 
function first.  
 
 
1. Disengage at work, or 
quit. 
 
Source: Derived from Clark and Fujimoto (1991).  
Toyota (and Honda) were able to establish relational contracts through significant investments in 
“gift exchange” (Akerlof 1984), which in effect meant giving to their suppliers and workers 
without formal assurance of any returns. For example many workers initially doubted the 
credibility of NUMMI’s no-layoff commitment, but in 1987 and 1988, when NUMMI was 
running under 65 percent of capacity Toyota did not lay off shop-floor workers, but instead sent 
the entire workforce to training classes, took back in-house certain previously contracted 
maintenance tasks such as painting, and placed surplus workers into teams that designed the 
production process for the next model car (Adler, Goldoftas, and Levine 1997). This step built a 
cycle of cooperation in which the union officials started suggesting some ways of cutting costs, 
and in turn Toyota set up accounts so that the union leaders could order supplies for their team 
members without having to file requests through management (as detailed in Adler 1993, pp. 68-
69).  
General Motors seems to have struggled to develop this dynamic. For example according to 
Steven Bera (in “This American Life,” 2010), a GM executive who was first sent to NUMMI and 
then sent to a number of other GM plants, said that even after GM plants began to install some of 
the physical features of Japanese auto plants, “there was no change in the culture. Workers and 
managers continued their old antagonistic ways. In some of the factories where they installed the 
andon cord, workers got yelled at when they pulled it. …” Some plant managers continued to 
believe that blue collar workers were fundamentally lazy and would pull the andon cord any time 
they wanted a break, and that the blue collar workers lacked the capacity to engage in problem 
solving or continuous improvement. By and large, the blue collar workforce appears to have 
doubted that the announced reforms would work, albeit for different reasons.  For example, 
Helper made several visits to a GM parts plant (now closed) in Trenton (New Jersey) in 1990. 
Workers had been told that their suggestions would be welcomed, and received training in 
Statistical Process Control. The workers responded by providing a flood of suggestions and by 
filling out charts tracking key quality metrics. However, management had not assigned anyone to 
respond to the suggestions, or examine the data the workers had carefully collected. The workers 
soon reverted to past patterns, feeling betrayed and much less interested in participating in future 
experiments. 18 
 
Retrospectively, of course, it is difficult to disentangle the relative roles that credibility and 
clarity played in derailing General Motors. In 1991 in the depths of recession, GM’s operating 
losses in North America were nearly $5 billion. Robert Stempel, the chief executive officer of 
GM at the time, who had been instrumental in trying to roll out new practices across the 
company, tried to placate impatient Wall Street critics by switching gears and announcing plans 
to close 21 plants and eliminate 74,000 jobs, 50,000 of them members of the United Auto 
Workers union. But there was little confidence that Stempel would carry through with these cuts 
as quickly as investors demanded. In 1992, the outside directors on GM’s board therefore 
engineered a sudden coup that removed Stempel and replaced him with Jack Smith, formerly of 
GM Europe. Although Jack Smith was one of the original negotiators of the NUMMI agreement, 
Babson (1998) reports that “Smith’s new team included the mercurial and unstable Ignacio 
Lopez, whose brief career at GM was marked by draconian demands that suppliers put all 
contracts up for rebidding and that they deliver dramatic productivity increases.”  Thus, GM’s 
early efforts to establish relational contracts (especially GM’s failure to develop a coherent story 
about how long-term investments in such relationships would pay off) looked to outsiders a lot 
like continued complacency. Indeed, the same financial losses in 1991 that finally convinced 
most of GM that it did need to change also removed some of the resources needed to make such 
a change possible.  
It was not until well into the first decade of the twenty-first century that the General Motors 
production system – a system that embodied most of Toyota’s practices and was rooted firmly in 
relational contracts – was broadly in place across the firm, largely as a result of the gradual 
diffusion across the firm of managers who had been trained at NUMMI and Saturn. The change 
came too late to save General Motors from bankruptcy. 
 
Conclusions and Implications  
We have suggested that General Motors first sharply declined and then failed for three reasons. 
First, it appears that GM’s enormous success led it to deny the threat posed by foreign 
competition for over a decade. It is hard to be definitive as to whether this denial was due to the 
ossifying effect of decades of market power, of weak internal incentives, or of cognitive biases in 
the senior team, particularly since these factors surely interacted.  One cannot even be sure that 
this denial was irrational, given the fact that many potential threats do not actually materialize 
and that the costs of significant change can be very significant.  
Second, even after General Motors recognized that its once-secure position was under threat, it 
took some time for the firm to understand the nature of the cluster of techniques that drove 
Japanese success. It had taken Toyota many years to develop what we now call “high 
performance work systems” – patterns of managerial practice that center around dense networks 
of communication and joint problem solving. Problems of complementarity and information 19 
 
localization may mean that, the implementation of these techniques is subject to the 
informational constraints that limit the rate of diffusion of any complex new technology.  
Third, these techniques could not be implemented without the simultaneous development of 
effective relational contracts, and General Motors had considerable difficulty building such 
contracts. GM’s history of adversarial relations with its blue collar workers and suppliers, its 
reliance on an operating model that assumed there was very little need to exchange knowledge 
across either firm or functional overlap and its muddled and unaccountable internal processes 
made it difficult to build the credibility fundamental to effective long-term relationships. 
Moreover even after the firm had recognized the importance of adopting techniques like 
continuous improvement and cross-functional communication, it took some years to understand 
the nature of the relational contracts that would be needed to diffuse them within the 
organization. Managers accustomed to governing by fiat appear to have found it difficult to 
understand the potential benefits of discussion and collaboration. Even after the techniques had 
been widely diffused and problems of clarity seemed to have been overcome, problems of 
credibility continued to arise, as the collapse in supplier relationships following GM’s apparent 
“defection” after its large financial losses in 1991 suggests.  
If this cluster of explanations for the decline of General Motors is essentially correct, it raises 
some intriguing questions. To what degree are these explanations more broadly descriptive of the 
decline of so many of GM’s contemporaries in the U.S. manufacturing sector? What  
implications might they have for our understanding of management today? What are some 
potentially fruitful avenues for further research? 
The decline of General Motors is exceptional in its scale, but many firms that dominated the US 
economy in the 1950s and 1960s echoed GM in responding slowly and ineffectively to the 
changing competitive landscape of the 1980s and 1990s. Global competition rooted in low-cost 
labor upended the apparel industry. New technology displaced Kodak and AT&T. Innovative 
domestic entrants replaced Sears and K-Mart. But at least two aspects of GM’s experience seem 
common to a wide range of firms. First, past success often led to extended periods of denial. For 
example the leaders of the American steel industry were extraordinarily slow to adopt 
competitive techniques (Christensen,1997), and  most of the major semiconductor producers 
refused to believe that their Japanese competitors were outflanking them (Ferguson, 1989). 
Indeed this pattern of denial following extended success appears to be a worldwide phenomenon. 
Nokia’s recent collapse and Sony’s decline suggest that it may be a danger for all large, 
successful firms. Even Toyota stumbled in 2010, in significant part due to its delayed reaction to 
customer quality concerns
5. Second, many large American manufacturers had difficulty adopting 
the bundle of practices pioneered by firms like Toyota. One careful study of effects of human 
resource management practices on the productivity of integrated steel finishing lines, for 
                                                           
5However, the automaker appears to have weathered the storm, regaining profits and market share.  20 
 
example, suggested that “better” practices were surprisingly slow to diffuse: 36 percent of the 
monthly observations in the sample used the traditional, “command and control” bundle of 
practices for all five years of the study and 58 percent still had no teams by the end of the period 
(Ichniowski et al. 1997). 
Some observers have suggested that these problems are evidence of “short-termism” in the 
American economy, or of an obsession with quantitative metrics, but the experience of General 
Motors suggests that this diagnosis is too simple. GM, particularly under Roger Smith in the 
early 1980s, made several very large investments – largely in technology – that were not 
expected to pay off for a long time. Instead, it appears that GM’s management did not initially 
understand – or had difficulty communicating – the long-term value of relational contracts.  
Similarly Toyota appears to have collected more quantitative metrics than GM, and done so 
more frequently. It was GM’s failure to use metrics as a guide to problem-solving, rather than as 
a measure for internal control, that created difficulty. 
Another stream of work suggests that the core problem is the nature of American labor and 
capital markets. For example, Hall and Soskice (2001) and others have argued  that the 
institutional structure of the Japanese and German economies makes it relatively easier for firms 
in those countries to build long-term relationships with their workforce and their supplier base. 
However the success of the Japanese and German automotive firms in the US – and GM’s 
eventual adoption of Toyota’s techniques – suggest that differences in institutional context 
cannot, alone, be determinative, although we cannot rule out the hypothesis that firms that have a 
history of relying on relational contracts in one market may have an advantage in building them 
in new geographies.  It remains an open question how the kinds of institutions that appear to 
have contributed to  Japanese and German manufacturing excellence might be adapted to help a 
US-owned firm remake itself by re-writing relational contracts and establishing new ones with 
workers and suppliers with whom it has a history of defection. 
The potential advantages of relational contracts may have more widespread applications.  Public 
support for economic growth has long focused on the diffusion of technology-based insights, but 
our work suggests that learning more about when (and what type of) relational contracts are 
likely to be valuable may be just as important. For example, many US firms appear to be 
managing their global supply chains on a spot basis. Some intriguing research has suggested that 
this may be suboptimal on a number of dimensions (for example, Locke 2013), and research that 
explores the conditions under which relational contracts may provide superior performance and 
how they can be built may be particularly valuable in this context.  
Viewing the firm through the lens of relational contracts may also have broader implications for 
the theory of the firm. In many economic models, the role of the manager is to make strategic 
choices – to decide which markets to enter and which inputs to combine--and to monitor 
subordinates. This view of the manager as a strategic architect or as an entrepreneur 
implementing a vision from the top down has deeply pervaded both the managerial literature and 21 
 
management practice. But although this perspective has proved illuminating and successful in 
many contexts, it omits the reality of building long-term relationships with people who often 
have very different interests and very different understandings of the world. Some suggestive 
empirical work, for example, suggests that “high commitment” or “purpose driven” firms are 
particularly successful in motivating their workforce (Pfeffer 1998), perhaps because they are 
better positioned to communicate clearly and credibly both within and across firm boundaries 
and can thus build relational contracts more easily. Similarly some intriguing qualitative studies 
have suggested that being able to combine the ability to form relational contracts with the ability 
to hold everyone concerned to very high standards of accountability may be a particularly 
powerful skill (Beer, 2009). If these findings are strengthened by ongoing research, the story of 
GM’s decline has the potential to open some important doors for how researchers view the firm.  
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Figure 1: Market Shares in the US Automotive Industry over time 
 
 
 
Source: Wards Automotive. 
 
 
Figure 2: The Productivity of GM’s Framingham assembly plant versus the Toyota Takaoka 
assembly plant, 1986. 
 
  GM Framingham  Toyota Takaoka 
     
Gross assembly hours per car  40.7  18.0 
     
Adjusted assembly hours per 
car 
31  16 
Assembly defects per 100 cars  130  45 
Assembly space per car (unit?)  8.1  4.8 
Inventories of parts (average)  2 weeks  2 hours 
 
Source: Womack, Jones and Roos, 1990 
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